Democracy, Journalism and Society

How useful is the notion of the Public Sphere relevant in contemporary media for assessing political significance in a democratic society?

Case Study: Videogames and Moral Panics

“Men go mad in herds while they only recover their senses slowly, one by one” (Mackay, 1956; pxx)

The notion of the public sphere was thought of by Habermas (1989) who theorized that the democratic form of society consists of a space (that may not be necessarily physical) where people can discuss issues without discrimination. This idea is the foundation of democracy; where everyone has a voice and is heard. By using the model of moral panics I will attempt to prove that the public sphere idea is flawed and does not promote the democratic ideal.

The model of moral panics consists of many elements (primarily people) that dynamically interact with one another with the purpose of inducing fear and calling attention on a particular issue to the public. Cohen (1972; 9) coined the term moral panics and defined it firstly as “a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.” This model then proceeds into five other traits/stages. They are (2) its nature being presented in a stylized stereotypical fashion; (3) the moral barricades are manned by editors, politicians and other right thinking people; (4) socially accredited “experts” pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; (5) ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to and finally (6) the condition disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.

To further elaborate on the model I will explain the stages in detail and relate them to the media effects argument against violent videogames; that they cause adolescents to commit violent crimes. I sampled newspaper articles from the Daily Mail between the period of March 2008 till present that address such issues and will use them as examples to explain the model of moral panics and its participants.

The first stage of moral panics concerns the object of the panic and its relation to the people involved. In this case violent videogames are the object while its relation to the people are the gamers who play these games. The people who commit these crimes are known as folk devils (Cohen, 1972; 10). They are the people whom society and the media deem we shouldn’t be by association and imitation of their practices; in this case gamers and the playing of violent videogames. The identity of the folk devil is created by the media and is subject to changes determined by them; this case a male adolescent who plays videogames. This is profiling, it generalizes all gamers in a bad light. The folk devil is then subjected to persecution by the moral barricades.

Editors, politicians and other right thinking people are these moral barricades and the creators of moral panics. Newspapers have political alliances with parties in order to propagate their ideology to the masses. Because they stand to profit from creating moral panics (editors from sales of newspapers and politicians with public approval) these group of people are collectively known as Moral Entrepreneurs (Becker, 1963). In the articles about violent videogames politicians from different parties (i.e. Conservative, Tory) are seen giving their support against violent videogames while calling for strict legislation against them. Why then does society listen to them? It is because the newspapers publish the moral panic and the public look to the news as a main source of information about the normative contours of society, it informs us about the right/wrong, boundaries and the current evils prevalent in our current era (Erickson, 1966; 7).

This ‘new media corrupting youth/women/minorities’ is not a new phenomenon (Rutter & Bryce, 2006; 207). According to Petly (1997; 87), the middle class (Moral Entrepreneurs) have been quick to disapprove of popular entertainment that the working class indulges in the past. Their justification being that they are more likely to be affected by media messages than the middle class are. This is unfounded (Petley 1997; 100) yet the media still use it to propagate these ideas and directed against an outgroup (folk devils); their power to justify discrimination is enormous (Critcher, 2003; 171).

To support their claims the media employs the use of socially accredited “experts” pronounce their diagnosis and solutions in fields which they might not be able apply their expertise to. For example, policemen who are quoted by the press that say youth crime is caused by playing violent videogames. These are merely hunches and prejudices with no claims to an expertise won in the rough and tumble research (Murdock, 1997; 76). In the articles I’ve read most of them contain opinions given by psychologists, media regulators (i.e. Ofcom) and the police.
Becker (1963) claims that when public concern about a particular moral panic is generated, a Moral Enterprise is formed. This is ‘the creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of society.’ In this stage, society changes itself for the object of moral panic and ways of coping are evolved or resorted to. This is the period where the Moral Entrepreneurs shine; politicians enforce legislations in attempts to stop the crimes from occurring. For videogames, rating systems are carefully scrutinized and revised while threats of heavy fines are enforced to videogame shops who sell games to people below the legal age.

It is imperative to highlight that so far the exchanges on ideas of moral panic, legislation and prohibition circulate only around the media, politicians and “experts”. If enough of these decide there is an issue and that action is required, a moral panic becomes possible (Critcher, 2003; 138). Society is not involved in this exchange. This means that a ‘discourse of the people is a discourse about the people, not by them’ and that their viewpoint is frequently assumed (Astroff & Nyberg, 1992).

The final stage is the panic disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. This means that eventually the object of moral panic (violent videogames) becomes largely ignored, bored by the recycling of the same issues (Downs, 1972; 38-50).
In summary, the model of moral panics have shown how the media and the government enforce their ideology unto society though hegemony (one sided exchange of ideas) and agenda setting (creation of moral panics and folk devils) to justify the discrimination and profiling of a subset of society. All these elements are contrary to the idea of democracy. Therefore I concur that this model proves that the public sphere is not relevant in assessing political significance in a democratic society.

References:
Astroff, R.J & Nyberg, A.K (1992) Discursive hierarchies and the construction of crisis in the news: a case study, Discourse and Society, 3(1).

Becker, H (1997) [1963] Outsiders, Free Press.

Cohen, S (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of mods and rockers, New York: St Martin’s Press.

Critcher, Chas (2003) Moral Panics and the media, Open University Press.

Downs, A (1972) Up and down with ecology: the ‘issue-attention’ cycle, The Public Interest, 28.

Erikson, Kai T. (2004) [1966]. Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance, Revised Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Harbermas, J (1991) [1989] The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought), Paperback edition. The MIT Press.

Mackay, C (1956) Extraordinary Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, London: George Harrap.

Murdock, G (1997) Ill Effects: The media/violence debate; Martin Barker & Julian Petley (Eds) London and New York: Routledge.

Petley, J (1997) Ill Effects: The media/violence debate; Martin Barker & Julian Petley (Eds) London and New York: Routledge.

Rutter J & Bryce J (2006) ‘Digital games and the violence debate’ in Understanding Digital Games, Sage Publications.